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I. Introduction
After the promulgation in January, 1978 of the Saudi Arabian Service
Agents Regulation (the Regulation),' which, in general, requires all non-
Saudi companies with Saudi government contracts to have a Saudi service
agent, a number of questions as to its proper interpretation immediately
arose. 2 During the following four years, certain developments have pro-
vided answers to a number of these questions. These developments also
indicate that the Saudi authorities have been making a concerted effort to
enforce not only the Regulation but other regulations with particular appli-
cation to foreign companies operating in the Kingdom.3 The effects of this
effort have been and are felt by foreign companies in the conduct of their
day to day business.
During the same period, work was reportedly underway on what was
thought to be a wholesale revision of the Saudi Arabian Commercial Agen-
cies Regulation,4 the regulation governing Saudi agents operating in the
*Member of the Illinois Bar.
tMember of the Egyptian Bar Association practicing in Saudi Arabia.
'Royal Decree M/2 of 1978.
'See Cartwright and Hamza, The Saudi Arabian Service Agents Regulation, 34 Bus. LAW.
475 (1979).
'Prior to 1977, foreign companies operating in the Kingdom did so typically under the
"sponsorship" of their Saudi agents or the government ministries with which they had con-
tracts, without any regard to local requirements to register, to pay taxes, etc. Undoubtedly,
some companies continue to do so, but their numbers are diminishing quickly as a result of the
authorities' withdrawal of their tacit consent to unregistered activity.
'Royal Decree M/ I I of 1962, amended by Royal Decree M/5 of 1969 and Royal Decree
M/8 of 1973. The Saudi Commercial Agencies Regulation reserves to Saudi individuals and
companies wholly owned by Saudis the conduct of all trading activities in the Kingdom.
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private sector. Finally, on June 23, 1980, Royal Decree No. M/32 was
promulgated as a further amendment to the Commercial Agencies Regula-
tion, and on March 30, 1981, the Ministry of Commerce of Saudi Arabia
issued Implementing Regulations under Royal Decree M/32.5 Except to
note that'these new regulations have been issued and are further evidence
of the Saudi authorities' determination to enforce the Kingdom's regula-
tions relating to foreign companies, and to point out that the Implementing
Regulations make clear that they do not bear upon Saudi companies acting
as service agents,6 the amended Commercial Agencies Regulations are
beyond the scope of this article. 7
This article first summarizes the effect of the Regulation. It then deals
with certain developments since its promulgation which illustrate how it has
been interpreted and enforced in conjunction with other Saudi regulations,
including the Companies Regulation 8 and the Foreign Capital Investment
Code (the Investment Code). 9 It then describes the parameters of the so-
called "disguised agency" problem.
II. Summary of the Service Agents Regulation
A. Requirement for a Service Agent
The Regulation, in general, requires that all "foreign contractors" includ-
ing individuals and companies performing consulting as well as construc-
tion work for the government of Saudi Arabia, have a service agent.' 0
Article 3 excepts from this requirement foreign companies which have a
Saudi partner. In practice, this means that if a foreign company has formed
a joint venture with a Saudi national (usually taking the form of a Saudi
limited liability company formed after the required approval under the
Investment Code is obtained), then as to government contracts of that joint
venture, no service agent is required.' ' In order to take advantage of incen-
tives available under the Investment Code, the capital of such an entity
'Minister of Commerce, Decision No. 1897 of 1981,
'Article I of the Implementing Regulations under Royal Decree M/32 provides that the
Regulations do not apply to service agents governed by Royal Decree M/2. Prior to this clari-
fication, it was reasonable to conclude that the two regulations applied concurrently to the
Saudi agent acting for a foreign company even only in connection with government business,
such representation being simply one form of commercial agency activity.
'See Cartwright, The New Saudi Commercial Agencies Regulation, 16 INT'L. LAW. 443
(1982). As a practical matter, notwithstanding the distinction in the application of the Com-
mercial Agencies Regulation and the Service Agents Regulation between government and pri-
vate sector business, many Saudi agents are at the same time both commercial and service
agents since they represent foreign companies both vis A vis the government and in the private
sector, The two regulations, therefore, do overlap in their application to many Saudi
companies.
'Royal Decree M/2 of 1965.
'Royal Decree M/4 of 1979.
'A foreign company's agreement with its service agent must be in writing.
"On the other hand, the Regulation does not expressly prohibit such a joint venture from
having an agent. If its agent is the Saudi partner in the venture, however, there may be a so-
called "disguised agency" problem. See the discussion at § IV, infra. (Prior to the promulga-
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must be at least 25 percent owned by Saudis. A joint venture may also take
the form of an unincorporated contractual joint venture, a form which is
most commonly used when the members want to limit their mutual
endeavor to a single project. If the partners in an unincorporated joint ven-
ture include foreign companies, each must have a Saudi service agent
(either the same or a different one), unless agency is prohibited by virtue of
the nature of the government project. If the unincorporated joint venture
includes a Saudi member, it is not necessary that the foreign members have
a service agent, however.
The Regulation further provides, at article 4, that no agency is permitted,
let alone required, in connection with armaments contracts and contracts
for "services related thereto," or in connection with contracts between the
Saudi government and foreign governments. Unfortunately, the precise
scope of the armaments and related services exception has not been consist-
ently defined by practice. Indeed, the position various ministries have
taken on the question of what types of contracts constitute armaments or
related services contracts sometimes seems inconsistent. 12  Even more
unfortunately, the various ministries' position on the question of agency has
occasionally come quite late in the tendering process. The "government to
government" exception often overlaps with the armaments exception since
many contracts involving the sale of arms are of this type. The Saudi-U.S.
Joint Economic Commission and the U.S. Department of the Army are also
the source of a number of government to government contracts not involv-
ing arms or related services, however.
B. Saudi Service Agents
The Regulation also imposes certain requirements that Saudis must meet
in order to act as service agents. In summary, service agents must be indi-
vidual Saudis actually resident in Saudi Arabia or Saudi companies which
hold commercial registrations permitting them to engage in agency activi-
ties, and specifically, to represent foreign companies. If the work required
by a given government contract includes principally "consulting services,"
tion of the Service Agents Regulation, there was no legal requirement that a foreign company
performing a government contract have an agent, although for practical reasons most did.).
'If a contracting ministry or department instructs bidders that there shall be no agents
involved, even with respect to projects which clearly do not involve armaments or related
services, the bidders are left in a legal and practical quandary. Articles I and 2 of the Regula-
tion oblige such companies to have service agents, but the tendering ministry requires them to
represent that they do not. The request for such a representation sometimes is accompanied by
the admonition that a false representation will result in being excluded from any further work
in the Kingdom. As a practical matter, a contractor has little choice in such a situation. If
time permits. it may seek to form a joint venture with its "agent," in lieu of the agency rela-
tionship. It may seek to terminate its agent if it already has appointed one, or it can choose not
to bid. The agent, of course, will wish to be compensated for any services rendered to date. In
view of the "no agency" certification which may be required, such a termination payment
probably may not be made contingent on the foreign company's being the successful bidder.
Otherwise, it may be deemed a commission, one indicia of agency.
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the foreign contractor's service agent must be a Saudi "consulting office."'I3
(By contrast, a Saudi joint venture company need not refrain from bidding
for consulting contracts with the government because its Saudi joint venture
partner is not a Saudi "consulting office.")
C. Conflicts of Interest
The Regulation sets forth a series of requirements which generally seek
to eliminate certain conflicts of interest in government procurement. For
example, article 6 provides that a foreign contractor may have more than
one service agent, each involved with separate (different) activities of the
foreign contractor. This at least implies that in connection with the same
government contract, a foreign company may have only one service agent.
Service agents may represent no more than ten foreign companies at any
one time.' 4 Article 6 does not say that a service agent may only act for one
competing bidder for a specific government contract, however. Most
agency agreements, if not commonly accepted business practice, exclude
such conflicts of interest, but they are not prohibited by the Regulation, and
there is no specific requirement that they be disclosed.' 5 (If a Saudi agent
represents two companies wishing to bid for the same contract, he may
"find" one of them another agent, but it is possible that the first agent will
arrange to split the second's commission if the referred contractor is
awarded the contract.)
The other anti-conflict of interest provision of the Regulation appears at
article 9. This prohibits the same agent from acting for foreign companies
seeking consulting and construction contracts with respect to the same proj-
ect. (This provision suggests the correctness of the analysis of the term
"consulting office" in other contexts of the Regulation; that is, it is the role
to be played by a foreign company in connection with a particular govern-
ment project that is controlling, not the inherent nature of the foreign
company.)
3This requirement has caused substantial confusion. Experience indicates, however, that
what was intended was to require that a foreign company appoint a Saudi consulting office
only if the government contract in question calls for the rendering of consulting services. Put
another way, it is the nature of the services called for by a given government contract, not the
nature of the potential contractor (e.g., a firm of architects as opposed to a construction com-
pany) which controls. Further confusion results from the use of the term "consulting office."
For certain purposes at least, by "consulting office" the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Commerce
(which regulates such offices) means a firm which combines the talents of individuals (whether
as principals or employees) qualified in different specialties within the same discipline; e.g.,
mechanical and electrical engineers. But it appears that a single "consultant" may act as a
service agent.
"This provision formerly caused substantial delays in registering foreign companies. This
difficulty has been eliminated, however. See § III, infra.
"
5Fundamental principles of fair dealing under the Islamic Shari'a, the "common law" of
Saudi Arabia, may be said to require disclosure.
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D. Limit on Compensation
Article 8 of the Regulation provides that a service agent must be compen-
sated for its services, and that the commission or fee may not exceed 5 per-
cent of the price of the government contract in question. In practice, a
service agent's commission is not frequently less than 5 percent, except in
the case of very large contracts or where, by virtue of the foreign company's
prior experience in the Kingdom, it requires little assistance from its service
agent either in preparing its bid or, upon obtaining the contract, in perform-
ing it.
The terms of reference normally applied by many Western businessmen
and lawyers (particularly lawyers in the service of certain U.S. government
agencies) simply do not permit acceptance of the fact that the services to be
performed by Saudi service agents can command the absolute amount of
compensation which results from the application of the typical 5 percent
measure, even in connection with contracts of modest size. The question,
therefore, arises whether a part of the agent's commission is not being (what
is politely called) "passed on" 16 to a government official instrumental in
awarding the contract. Further, some U.S. companies have adopted corpo-
rate policies that test the permissibility of agency commissions by the appli-
cation of a cost-benefit test. But in the Saudi Arabian frame of reference a
cost-benefit analysis is often not the only or even the principal test of
whether a commission is justifiable, and the failure of such a test certainly
does not imply that a corrupt payment has been made. Rather, commis-
sions are often justified on a simple "but for" basis; i.e., presumably but for
the agent, the contractor would have no contract. The Saudi government's
official policy, however, is to prohibit mere middlemen or business finders
or brokers from acting as service agents.17
The government is well aware, of course, that agents' commissions are
"built-in" to contractors' pricing. And recently, the "but-for" basis for
commissions (even as limited by the 5 percent ceiling) appears to have
undergone reexamination by some government officials, mainly senior tech-
"This factor alone probably does not constitute "reason to know," especially if it can be
demonstrated (as it probably can be in Saudi Arabia) that the amount reflects the application
of a commonly accepted "going rate." Nevertheless, many fear that the "reason to know"
standard imposed by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act might be met by the failure of a
cost-benefit analysis test and little else. A proposed amendment, which passed the Senate,
would eliminate the reason to know standard, substituting a standard of liability based upon
the direction or authorization by a U.S. concern of a corrupt payment. Authorization could be
established expressly or by a "course of conduct."
"The Saudi government indicated that it intended Saudi businessmen, not mere "brokers"
or "intermediaries" to be service agents and, therefore, the recipients of commissions. See
communique of Council of Ministers appearing in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 2664, February
25, 1977. Article 10 of the Regulation prohibits an agency relationship whose purpose is to
exercise "undue influence or mediation." Presumably, the reason for this is mainly to seek to
reduce influence peddling and bribery; but it may also support the notion that the Saudi gov-
ernment wished the benefit of commissions to fall upon those who would most likely use the
proceeds to build an indigenous private sector economy; i.e., established Saudi businessmen.
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nocrats. Dissatisfaction with the 5 percent commission ceiling provided by
the Regulation has been publicly voiced, and suggestions that it be changed
have reportedly been discussed within the government. The most likely
substitute would presumably be some absolute maximum commission
(without reference to the size of the contract), or a sliding scale of maxi-
mum commissions depending on the size of the contract, such as was
adopted in Abu Dhabi. 1 8 Reform in this area is probably being resisted by
influential members of the Saudi private sector and, therefore, from certain
quarters within the government as well.
Another response to the dissatisfaction with the 5 percent commission
formulation of the Regulation has been to encourage, if not legally require,
large government projects to be open only to foreign companies which bid
in joint venture with a Saudi company, without a Saudi agent. The Royal
Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, the government agency responsible for
development of the two new industrial cities with those names, is in the
forefront of this trend. Nevertheless, in substance the same abuse (i.e.,
overcharging by reason of the payment of what are essentially "commis-
sions") still can, and does, remain in connection with joint venture bids.
(See the discussion of Disguised Agency at § IV, infra).
III. The Regulation and Foreign Company Registration
To understand how the Resolution has been interpreted and enforced,
one should be aware of one other Saudi regulation which directly affects
foreign companies engaged in performing Saudi government contracts.
The Companies Regulation, at article 228, requires foreign companies
engaged in business in the Kingdom to register branches. The Ministry of
Commerce permits foreign companies whose activities are confined to per-
forming contracts with the government to satisfy this requirement in an
expedited but temporary way, by registering a "temporary branch"; i.e., by
obtaining, as it is now known, a "temporary license." (For years, this
requirement was ignored by many foreign companies and by the Saudi
authorities as well.)
About one year after the Regulation was issued, the Ministry of Com-
merce issued its Resolution 680.19 Resolution 680 reminded foreign com-
panies of the fundamental fact that if they are to do business in the
Kingdom under government contracts or subcontracts, they are supposed to
be properly registered to do so. It also provided a short registration grace
period.
Temporary licenses are authorizations from the Ministry of Commerce to
foreign companies which are Saudi government contractors or subcontrac-
"See article 8 of Law No. 4 of 1977 of Abu Dhabi, which limits commissions to 2 percent on
tenders up to Dhs 10 million, one and one-half percent on tenders exceeding Dhs 10 million
but which are less than Dhs 50 million, and I percent on tenders exceeding Dhs 50 million.
(As of June 10, 1982 Dh 1.00 = US $0.27.)
'Resolution 680 has been subsequently amended. See infra note 21.
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tors to perform their obligations in the Kingdom. By definition, these
licenses are limited to the duration of the government contract or subcon-
tract for which they are obtained (indeed temporary licenses carry an expi-
ration date tied to the date by which performance under the contract is to
be completed) and to the types of activities which foreign contractors have
agreed to perform thereunder. Activities which are not required by such
contracts or subcontracts are not permitted. 20
The promulgation and enforcement of Resolution 680 also provided a
convenient vehicle for the enforcement of the Regulation. As noted, with
certain exceptions the Regulation requires most foreign companies with
government contracts to have a service agent. It was a simple matter to
include in the Resolution 680 temporary license application form, a
requirement that a foreign company's service agent furnish a letter to be
appended to the form. Without this letter, signed by a Saudi manager of
the service agent, the form would not be accepted and the foreign company
could not obtain its license. 2' The requirement for a letter from the foreign
company's service agent (which formerly had to contain a representation
that the agent represented no more than ten foreign companies) 22 has now
been eliminated, but a foreign company seeking a temporary license must
still demonstrate it has a Saudi service agent by filing a copy of its service
agency agreement. 23 (The Ministry of Commerce recently issued a sug-
gested form of service agency contract.)
2 In practice, companies with temporary licenses, being prima facie in the Kingdom legally,
sometimes engage in activities unrelated to those called for by the contracts on which their
temporary licenses are based. But this unrelated activity is illegal.
"The Minister of Commerce subsequently issued Decision No. 940, effective October 27,
1981, requiring foreign companies to submit a number of documents in addition to those pre-
scribed by Resolution 680 (including some issued by third parties) in order to obtain tempo-
rary licenses. Among other things, a letter from a bank approved by the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency is required, as are certifications as to the satisfactory performance of prior
contracts in the same field. These new requirements were inspired by a Decision of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, at the insistence of the Saudi Ports Authority, which attempts to respond to
complaints about the lack of capacity of certain foreign companies actually to perform the
work that their contracts require them to perform. (These new documents are required to
extend existing temporary licenses as well as to obtain new ones.)
"Some otherwise very straightforward Resolution 680 temporary licenses were undoubtedly
withheld for some time while the foreign company's Saudi service agent tried to deal with the
problem posed by this representation. The end result was predictable. Large Saudi agencies
formed affiliates, among which the agencies' foreign company clients were divided so that no
one entity represented more than ten companies.
"The Ministry of Commerce also has recently required that foreign companies seeking a
temporary license furnish an undertaking to observe the government's requirements to
purchase locally manufactured goods appearing on a list provided by the Ministry, to purchase
foreign manufactured goods only on the local market from Saudi agents or distributors, if
available, and to import their requirements for foreign goods not available in the Kingdom
only through Saudi import agents. These new government requirements essentially prohibit
foreign companies from importing in their own name goods purchased abroad, even if the
goods are for their own use or for incorporation in a government project, a very substantial
expansion of the long-standing requirement of the Commercial Agencies Regulation that trad-
ing in Saudi Arabia be reserved to Saudis. (See note 4, supra).
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The temporary license application form itself does not permit any exemp-
tions from the requirement that a foreign company have a service agent.
Although it was immediately recognized that certain exemptions must have
been intended (e.g., for armaments contractors), 24 for some time there was
doubt whether government subcontractors had to have a service agent. The
Companies Department of the Ministry of Commerce originally took the
position that they did, and this was taken by some (including the authors)
as substantial evidence that the Regulation was, in general, intended to
apply to subcontractors. 25 If the Regulation applied to subcontractors, then
presumably they were required to have service agents and to pay them com-
missi ns. Further, it was noted that if the main and all principal subcon-
tractors had service agents and each paid its agent 5 percent of the value of
its contract, total commissions paid with respect to one government contract
would be staggeringly in excess of 5 percent of the main contract price, a
result which may not have been intended.
After several months, the Companies Department backed away from its
initial position. It issued a supplemental form of undertaking by foreign
companies to be filed in conjunction with the basic Resolution 680 tempo-
rary license application form when no service agent is required. A foreign
company may indicate on this form that it does not have a service agent
either because (1) its government contract antedates the Regulation, (2) it is
a subcontractor, or (3) its contract is for armaments or related services. 26
The result then is that the Ministry of Commerce has taken the view that,
for company registration purposes, although the Regulation does not
require a subcontractor to have a service agent, a subcontractor may have
one. The Ministry has not reversed its initial position that subcontractors
must have agents by providing that they may not. It rather has adopted a
neutral position. Indeed, if a foreign subcontractor has an agent, in apply-
ing for its temporary license it may not claim the exemption provided by
the supplemental. undertaking, but rather must furnish the information
which the application form requires as to the agent. 27 (To the authors'
2 When in doubt, presumably the contracting government ministry's determination that a
contract is of this type should be controlling and, if necessary, the contracting ministry should
be willing to formally so advise the Companies Department of the Ministry of Commerce.
"Notwithstanding that the Regulation itself speaks in terms only of government contractors
(i.e., foreign companies in privity of contract with the government and which have bound
themselves to perform services in the Kingdom).
26The supplemental form does not include reference to the exemption for (non-armament)
government to government contracts, but it is generally accepted that this kind of contractor
can take the position, for registration purposes, that it is a "'subcontractor." More significantly,
the Ministry of Commerce also recently indicated that it may entertain applications for tempo-
rary licenses by Aramco contractors. Previously, foreign companies seeking to contract with
Aramco had to have a Saudi commercial registration; i.e., a permanent branch registration,
which requires approval under the Investment Code.
2 Notwithstanding the argument that the Regulation (including the 5 percent commission
ceiling) does not apply at all, if a subcontractor on a government project has an agent, the
Ministry of Commerce will not issue a temporary license if the commission to be paid is in
excess of 5 percent.
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knowledge, no one is suggesting that in addition to a revision of the 5 per-
cent commission ceiling,28 the Service Agents Regulation be amended to
prohibit subcontractors on government projects from having agents. Such
an amendment, however, could certainly have a dramatic effect on the cost
of government projects.)
IV. Disguised Agency
Foreign companies which are in unincorporated joint ventures with
Saudis need have no service agent in connection with government contracts.
Similarly, foreign companies which have taken advantage of the incentives
available under the Inve ment Code and the Tender Regulations 29 by
forming Saudi joint venture companies, need have no Saudi agents. (The
principal incentives are a five or ten year holiday from Saudi Arabian
income tax and certain preferences in the award of government contracts.)
Under the Investment Code, however, a joint venture company must have a
Saudi shareholder who owns at least 25 percent of the capital of the com-
pany and, under the Tender Regulations, to achieve second preference, the
Saudi company must have at least 50 percent Saudi capital. Nevertheless,
venturers sometimes try to structure their joint venture as the economic
equivalent of an agency. These arrangements typically are accompanied by
the parties' agreement that the Saudi "venturer" need bring nothing to the
joint venture except to furnish to it those kinds of services which are nor-
mally called for in agency agreements, and that the Saudi is entitled to a
share in the company's gross revenue, not net profit, if any. It is not unu-
sual for the Saudi party even to insist that the foreign company contribute
to the joint venture company the Saudi shareholder's share of the capital.
With accession to that demand, the last vestige of a true joint venture, as
opposed to a disguised agency, disappears.30
The Saudi Companies Regulation makes it possible to structure a joint
venture limited liability company's memorandum of association in a way
that probably makes such an arrangement technically enforceable between
the parties, and, of course, no such technical problem inhibits the members
of an unincorporated joint venture. For various reasons, however, share-
holders in Saudi companies may not wish their agreements in this regard to
appear in the company's memorandum of association, a public document
which must be published in the Official Gazette. But one effect of not
setting out shareholders' agreements in this regard in a Saudi company's
memorandum of association is that they may be thereby rendered unen-
2 See the discussion at § I.D. supra.
"Royal Decree M/14 of 1977.3
°To protect themselves against the possibility that the joint venture company will not have
profits sufficient to pay a "minimum" dividend, Saudi "joint venturers" also sometimes insist
that their "commission" be guaranteed by the foreign venturer. (A Saudi limited liability com-
pany, the only Saudi entity available for most foreign investment, cannot issue preference
shares.)
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forceable, 3 1 although, for this reason alone, they probably are not illegal.
Obviously, if the disguised arrangement seeks to guarantee the Saudi
shareholder a share of the joint venture company's gross revenue from gov-
ernment contracts greater than 5 percent, a persuasive argument can be
made that the foreign company (as well as the Saudi) have, in substance,
committed a violation of the Regulation by exceeding the 5 percent ceiling
on commissions. One sanction for a violation of the Regulation by a for-
eign company is that it may be prohibited from engaging in any further
business in Saudi Arabia. 32
Even if a disguised agency arrangement calls for a "commission" to the
Saudi shareholder of 5 percent or less of the joint venture's gross revenue,
to the extent the joint venture has bid and obtained a government contract
based in part on its "second preference" under the Tender Regulations, it
may arguably have misrepresented itself to its governmental customer.33
The Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu is quite careful about its
being misled by bids of wholly Saudi owned companies, entitled to first
preference under the Tender Regulations, where, for example, nearly all or
a substantial part of the work called for will be subcontracted to foreign
companies. There is no reason that it and other ministries will not become
equally wary about second preference bidders.
Finally, under the Investment Code, the holiday from Saudi income tax
for the foreign shareholder in a Saudi joint venture company requires that
Saudis own at least 25 percent of the company's capital. It is nearly univer-
sally recognized that this does not mean that Saudi shareholders must also
be entitled to at least 25 percent of the profits of the joint venture company,
and, as noted, the Saudi Companies Regulation permits the shareholders to
vary their respective shares in profits from their shares of capital by a provi-
sion in the memorandum of association. 34 It also apparently is the quite
reasonable view of the Foreign Capital Investment Committee, 35 however,
that implicit in the requirement that Saudis account for at least 25 percent
of the capital, is the notion that they must have an interest in the company
which is in fact that of a shareholder, i.e., the Saudi shareholders' capital
3 Article 171 of the Saudi Companies Regulation provides that unless the memorandum of
association otherwise provides, each shareholder's share in the profits of the company will be
the same as his share of the capital. It is possible, however, to provide in the memorandum of
association that the shareholders may agree on their respective shares in the profits on a project
by project, or annual, basis.
"
2From a U.S. standpoint, a joint venture that disguises an agency relationship probably
raises more questions than it answers in terms of justifying the "commission" due.
3 See article I(d) of the Tender Regulations, supra note 31. Note, however, that Article l(d)
measures qualification for second preference only on the proportion of the company's capital
that is Saudi owned. (It is doubtful that these preferences have, to date, in practice been
important factors in the award of government contracts.)
"
4As noted, such provision usually takes the form of an agreement to agree on the division of
profits. Even if a later agreement is binding on the shareholders, it may not be binding on the
Saudi tax authorities. See infra note 37.
3"An interministerial body which is attached to the Ministry of Industry and Electricity and
which reviews foreign investment applications filed under the Investment Code.
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must be at risk and must be more than de minimis. 36 If the disguised
arrangements include a guarantee by the foreign shareholder that the Saudi
shareholder will receive, at a minimum, a specified percentage of the joint
venture company's gross income, that is arguably inconsistent with a basic
characteristic of the ownership of capital in a company. This is especially
true if the disguised arrangement also requires the foreign company to con-
tribute the Saudi party's nominal share of the capital, or to make the Saudi
party a non-recourse loan in the same amount. Upon discovery, the result
could be the retroactive revocation of the foreign company's investment
license or the withdrawal of benefits made available by the Investment
Code, including the tax holiday.
37
V. Conclusion
The Saudi authorities which deal most frequently with foreign compa-
nies, in the context particularly of foreign company registrations, foreign
investment applications and government tenders, are becoming increasingly
sophisticated in the enforcement of the requirements of the Service Agents
Regulation. The Ministry of Commerce has been astute in employing the
temporary license device as a tool for enforcing the requirement that for-
eign companies indeed employ service agents where required, and that they
and their service agents observe other applicable legal requirements.
Growing dissatisfaction with the Regulation's 5 percent commission ceiling
may bring amendments to the Regulation which in turn will require more
sophisticated enforcement devices. In the meantime, the phenomenon of
disguised agencies poses difficulties with which the Saudi authorities have
not yet systematically dealt.
3 Even if these two criteria are arguably technically met because the Saudi shareholder actu-
ally contributes his share of capital from his own funds and obtains no guarantee of his profit
share from the non-Saudi shareholder, the nondisclosure of such an arrangement in the docu-
ments submitted to the Foreign Capital Investment Committee could constitute a violation of
the Investment Code.
"'See article 23 of the Implementing Regulations under the Investment Code. (It is gener-
ally understood that the Foreign Capital Investment Committee has the sole authority to grant
and revoke tax holidays, and that the Saudi tax authorities have no independent authority in
this regard. Should the tax authorities discover a disguised agency, however, they may bring it
to the attention of the Foreign Capital Investment Committee, with the recommendation that
the foreign investment license, and the tax holiday, be revoked. Indeed, the Saudi tax authori-
ties have already taken the position that any share of a Saudi company's profit attributed to its
foreign shareholders which exceeds their share in the company's capital, is taxable, notwith-
standing a tax holiday.)

